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THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIRTUES AND VICES
OF TIlE NEW DEAL
A1<HIL REED AMAR*
The topic of our panel today-the New Deal-is a vast one, so
let me try to identify six features of it, three that I like (sorry,
Richard) and three that I don't (sorry, Bruce).l
In the course of addressing these six issues, I shall try to take
seriously the thought experiment that my Yale colleague,
Professor Bruce Ackerman, has extended to us all. He would
like us to think about the New Deal as a constitutional moment
akin to the Founding and the Reconstruction-a moment that, in
effect, gives us the constitutional equivalent of a formal textual
amendment.2 Only that thought experiment, he suggests, can
truly make sense of all the ways in which modern
jurisprudence changed as a result of the New Deal. Unless we
posit something like this hidden constitutional amendment
with a certain kind of gravitational pull-like some unseen,
distant planet out there whose existence can be deduced only
from its effects-Ackerman argues that we can't make sense of
our current state of affairs.
I propose that, at least as to the three things that I like about
the New Deal, we need not posit an unwritten New Deal
amendment; and as to the three things that I don't particularly
like about the New Deal, perhaps it's a good thing that no
written New Deal amendment exists. (Maybe we are not stuck
with those things.)
I. VIRTUES
First, the New Deal, as I understand it, affirms the
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School What follows is a lightly revised
version oforal remarks delivered at the Seventeenth Annual StudentSymposium of the
Federalist Society. '
1. I allude here to my co-panelist and New Deal critic Richard Epstein, and to my
colleague and New Deal champion Bruce Ackerman.
2 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEoPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34-57 (1991).
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permissibility of governmental redistribution. This is a good
thing. In my view, it is a legitimate government function to
take from the rich and give to the poor in the name of
democratic equality and a suitably republican vision of equal
citizenship.
Now, this is precisely what Lochner v New York? rejects. Many
of you might think that Lochner is basically about freedom of
contract, but this is not quite so. A careful reading of the case
shows that Lochner is willing to make its peace with all sorts of
paternalistic legislation interfering with an individual's ability
to contract. What Lochner rejects is the legitimacy of what it
calls I/a labor law, pure and simple,I/4 by which it means a law
designed to alter the bargaining power between employers and
employees, or more generally, the haves and the have-nots, the
rich and the poor. That's the essence of Lochner, as I understand
it-the illegitimacy of governmental redistribution.
Now, as an original matter, I am not sure that this follows
from our original constitutional structure. Yes, you could look
at the Takings Gause, which originally applies only to the
federal government,S and you could look at the Contracts
Gause, which applies only to state governments,6 and you
could try to put the two together and deduce some broad
structural principle opposed to redistribution. You could even
look at early judicial statements that the government may not
take from A and give to B7-but you would be misreading those
early judicial statements, because A and B were individuals in
those cases, and when the government acts on an individual to
his detriment and takes something from individual A, that's a
bill of attainder violating basic ideas of legislative generality
and prospectivity.S I do not read these cases as saying that
government may never take from class A and give to class B
when legislation is suitably general and prospective-but it's a
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. ld. at 57.
5. u.s. CONSI'. amend. V ("No person shall .•. be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .•. ")
6. U.s. CONSI'. art I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No Slate shall ... pass any .•• Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts ....")
7. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase,
J.)(limiting the reach of the ex post facto clause).
8. See generally AkhiI Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REv. 203, 208-21 (1996).
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debatable question at the Founding.
So, I can understand why friends of Lochner may say
something like the following: "We are simply deducing a basic
structural principle opposed to redistribution. Madison does
not have very nice things to say about redistribution in The
Federalist No. 10 when he talks about paper money and other
terrible ideas."9
On the other hand, even before the Civil War, there's the
Republican Government Clause,1o which is about creating a
society of equal citizens, and even James Madison believed that
it was essentially un-republican to have a regime in which you
had a very few wealthy people and lots of people without
anything. That was not the social and economic structure on
which a suitably democratic or republican society of equal
citizens could be built, and even Madison believed in laws that
would silently equalize the extremes of wealth and poverty,!1
But even if you don't buy my argument as a Founding
matter, consider the Reconstruction. Here we have a massive
taking from the A:s of the world and giving to the B's. It's
called emancipation. This is a massive redistribution of lawfUl
property, property that was lawful at the time; the government
simply modifies that and gives people their bodies, even
though their bodies, at one point, had been lawfully owned by
someone else. Thus sayeth the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Emancipation Proclamation. Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment goes even further. It prohibits any compensation
of slave-holders for the taking of their once-lawful property,
even in the so-called border states-the middle states which had
remained faithful to the Union.12
So I am not convinced Lochner actually is the best reading of
the Constitution in 1905, but it is a plausible one.
However, it is not a plausible reading, in my view, after the
Sixteenth Amendment,13 the income tax amendment, which is
9. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 Games Madison) (Ointon Rossiter ed., 1961)
(criticizing the "rage for paper money" and "other improper or wicked project[s] ...•")
10. U.s. CoNST. art IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form ofGovernment ....")
11. See James Madison, Parties, NATL GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792 reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197-98 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1983).
12 U.s. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 4 ("Butneither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any ... claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave ....")
13. U.s. CaNST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
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not just about an income tax, but a progressive income tax, a
redistributive income tax, an income tax that's going to be a 5-
percent tax on the income of millionaires, designed to reduce
the great inequalities of wealth between rich and poor. That is
what the Sixteenth Amendment is all about, so even if
redistribution was arguably an illegitimate governmental
purpose in 1905, it clearly wasn't after 1913.
You might respond that the Sixteenth Amendment was
about the federal government and not the states, but I think it
affirms the permissibility of a certain kind of government
action, and this affirmation has profound implications even for
the states. And that connects to my second point, which is a
point about rights generally. The basic idea of the Fourteenth
Amendment, after all, is that Americans should generally have
the same set of fundamental civil rights against both state and
federal governments. That is the basic meaning of
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, and
reverse incorporation of equal protection principles against the
federal government. After the Fourteenth Amendment, we
moved away from the Founders' world where Americans had
different sets of rights against the different governments-for
instance, Contract Clause rights against the states14 and
Takings Clause rights against the Feds,15
So the second point that I like about the New Deal is, in
short, footnote four of Carolene Products16 The first paragraph of
footnote four basically anticipates the incorporation idea, that
there are certain rights originally defined against the federal
government, that are every bit as important and specific when
made fully applicable against states. That's paragraph one,
what we call today incorporation. Paragraph two affirms the
importance of protecting political inputs-speech, press,
petition, and assembly-the openness of a political process
against incumbents who might try to choke off criticism or
opposition speech. Paragraph three talks about the importance
of protecting discrete and insular minorities.
Now, in Professor Ackerman's account, just as he posits a
. ")onmcomes ..••
14. u.s. CONST. art I, § 10, d. 1 ("No Slate shall ..• pass any ... Law impairing file
Obligation of Contracts ....")
15. U.s. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberly, or
properly, wifilout due process of law •.••")
16. See United Slates v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 u.s. 144, 152nA (1938).
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sort of New Deal amendment to validate governmental
redistribution, he says that once the courts get out of the
property-protection business, they must have something to do,
so they need to get into the rights-protecting business in the
three paragraphs of Carolene Products-via a kind of law of
conservation of judicial energy.17
I doubt we need anything so indirect to justify footnote four.
We need only take seriously the words and the spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and along all three of these
dimensions of footnote four, the Fourteenth Amendment
provides very strong support. First, the Fourteenth
Amendment is about incorporation of the Bill of Rights against
the states. I can't prove that big point in the small time I have
now, but I have tried to prove that point in my book on the Bill
of Rights.l8 The Fourteenth Amendment is also about specially
protecting things like speech, press, petition, and assembly
from intolerant governments, state and federal, which tried to
shut down broad movements like abolitionism. Finally, the
Fourteenth Amendment is about protecting discrete and
insular minorities-paradigmatically, black people and
Unionists in the South.
So, in my view, we don't need some fancy New Deal
Amendment to account for all three paragraphs of footnote
four-we just need to take seriously the pre-existing Fourteenth
Amendment.
The third thing that I like about the New Deal is its
repudiation of Hammer v. Dagenhart19 and its embrace of a
suitably broad, but not unlimited, reading of the Commerce
Oause.20 By IIsuitably broad,lI I mean the following: Things that
are truly interstate in their effects can be regulated by the
legislature in which all the states are represented, whereas
things where the basic effects are felt within a state-where
there's no externality, positive or negative-should be regulated
by the individual states. So I would focus less on the word
IIcommercell and more on the interstate-intrastate idea.
17. See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 113-30.
18. See A1<HIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREAnON AND RECONSTRUcnON
(1998).
19. 247 U.s. 251 (1918).
20. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 u.s. 1 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act).
HeinOnline -- 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 224 1998-1999
224 HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 22
We have, in my view, broader congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce after 1937, not because of some
amendment-equivalent adopted as a result of a constitutional
moment, but just because, in the real world, a lot more things
are interstate due to improvements in transportation and
communication technology. The percentage of our genuine
Gross Domestic Product that involves people and things that
cross state lines-pollution molecules, wild animals, the
internet, and so on-is just much, much bigger than it was prior
to 1937.
Having said all that, we could still perfectly well say that a
case like United States v. Lopez21 is properly decided. Congress
does not enjoy unlimited power, and crime in schools might be
a genuinely national problem (a problem everywhere), but not a
federal problem (not an interstate problem) because the effects
are so localized. Because blood is so immediate in time, its
effects tend to be localized in space. I fail to see why we would
necessarily need an interstate federal government to get
involved; it may not be a truly federal problem even though it
might be a national problem.
II. VICES
There are at least three things that I do not particularly like
about the New Deal. First, it repudiates the unitary executive. I
am thinking here of the case of Humphrey's Executor v. United
States,22 and the larger specter of a headless fourth branch of
government conjured up by that case. Federal officers who
enforce federal laws should, in some sense, be accountable to
and part of the executive department headed by a President of
the United States in whom the executive power is vested. This
was a sensible idea 200 years ago, and remains sensible today.
The most difficult counter-example is the Federal Reserve.
There may be reasons to deny a modern-day plebiscitarian
presidency-a partisan presidency-complete power over the
<' money spigot. This is a problem the Founders did not
anticipate-in which a post-Twelfth Amendment presidency
21. 514 u.s. 549 (1995) (shiking down federal statute criminalizing guns in schools,
as beyond the proper scope ofcongressional power under the commerce clause).
22 295 U.s. 602 (1935) (allowing Congress to limit the President's removal of quasi-
legislative, quasi-judicial officers).
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interacts with Keynesian and post-Keynesian economics. It
might also be worth discussing, if we wanted to indulge in
Lessigian "translation," the quasi-independent first and second
national banks, which were not controlled completely by the
presidents of the United States.
Second, I do not particularly like the New Deal's hostility to
and repudiation of juries, both criminal and civil-institutions
that were central to the Founding experience. A 1930s case that
exemplifies this hostility is Patton v. United States,Z3 which says,
notwithstanding the words of Article ill,24 that you can have
federal criminal trials without juries. I fail to see why that's so. I
understand why the New Deal is very pro-administrative
agency and hostile to certain forms of citizen participation, but
if we don't have Bruce Ackerman's unwritten New Deal
amendment, perhaps we need not accept the trivialization of
the jury.
Finally, the non-justiciability of Article V is a basic artifact of
New Deal jurisprudence as laid down in the case of Coleman v.
Miller.25 If Article V and its pre-existing practice and precedent
are taken seriously, I fail to see why the amendment process is
non-justiciable. I understand why Coleman was decided the
way it was, and it connects to our earlier story. Congress tried
to regulate child labor via the commerce clause, but the Court
said no, you can't do that.26 Had the states tried to regulate
trans-state child labor via the police power, the Court doctrine
would have said no, you can't do thatP And so, a
constitutional amendment was proposed to overrule Supreme
Court case law. When opponents of the amendment appealed
to the Supreme Court arguing that the amendment hadn't been
ratified quickly enough and had thus lost its vitality, the Court
felt a prudential awkwardness about limiting the one override
that the Constitution clearly gives the people when they dislike
a Supreme Court case. So the Coleman Court essentially said
that the entire Article V process is non-justiciable,28 and thus
23. 281 us. 276 (1930).
24. u.s. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes ..• shall be by Jury")
(emphases added).
25. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
26. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
27. See PAUL BRFST & SANFORD LEvINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION
MAKING 321 (3d 1992).
28. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450 ("We think that ... the question of the efficacy of
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removed itself from the process.
I think that was an overreaction. You could imagine other
constitutional amendments that are not targeted at the Court
but rather are targeted at Congress. In such a case, it would be
quite useful for the courts to weigh in, as they weigh in
elsewhere, to decide what the law is and whether a certain
alleged amendment really has met the formal requirements of
the Constitution.
So, in the spirit of disaggregation, I propose that there are
some aspects of the New Deal that we should embrace and
others that we should not. On these six topics, at least, perhaps
we do not really need Professor Ackerman.'s unwritten
constitutional amendment to make good sense of our current
constitutional condition.29
ratifications by state legislatures . • • should be regarded as a political question
pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in
the exercise ofits control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.")
29. As should be evident from my extremely informal presentation, my thinking
about the New Deal is still highly preliminary, and I shall need to study it a good deal
more before reaching any final conclusions on Professor Ackerman's bold thesis. The
legal community is very much in his debt for urging us to rethink our basic
constitutional narrative.
